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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the distinctive features of judicial decision making is that
judicial decisions are typically accompanied by written reasons. A
judicial decision is not simply an outcome, but rather an outcome
accompanied by reasons-that is, it is a discursive explanation intended
to persuade the relevant audience that the outcome is justified, and this
is done by describing the path of legal logic to which the outcome is the
appropriate terminus. For everyone except the immediate parties (and
sometimes even for them) the outcome matters less than the reasons,

which constitute both a signal to other similarly-situated actors and a
resource which such actors can use for their own purposes. Canadian
usage, which identifies "reasons for judgment," is in this regard more
explicitly and accurately self-descriptive than American usage, which
identifies majority and minority "opinions."
From a functional point of view, the giving of reasons limits the
discretion (the "power") of the judge in two different and important
ways: first, because one cannot give decisions for which one cannot find
and document the necessary and appropriate reasons, the "giving

reasons requirement" is a protection against arbitrary decision making;1
and second, the reasons for a specific outcome constitute something of a
redeemable pledge to similarly-situated litigants in the future. As
Schauer suggests, the argument from precedent is forward looking as
well as backward looking, because "[tioday is not only yesterday's
tomorrow; it is also tomorrow's yesterday." 2 Indeed, this shadow on the
future that is cast by the immediate decision provides one of the reasons
1 See, for example, M. Shapiro, "The Giving Reasons Requirement" (1992) U. Chi. Legal F.
179.
2 F. Schauer, "Precedent" (1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 at 573.
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why, even on a unanimous panel court, it can sometimes make a
considerable difference which specific judge delivers the reasons for
judgment.
As Britain's distinguished jurist Lord Denning has stated, the
giving of reasons is "the whole difference between a judicial decision and
an arbitrary one."'3 This difference, in turn, explains why the American
constitutional tradition regards the courts as the "least dangerous
branch" of government: "[j]udges, generally speaking, have derivative,
rather than primary, authority. Even though they have great power, they
are not supposed to act free and unfettered.... rather, [they are] bound
by 'the law."' 4 The need to work within the framework of authoritative
citations limits the discretion of judges, and an examination of the
citations that judges acknowledge as setting those limits indicates where
judges find their cues and what values they seek to promote. "Citation
patterns ... reflect conceptions of role. ... These patterns may be clues,

too, to the role of courts in society."5 It is important to remember,
however, that the reasons for judgment constitute a reasoned argument
by the judge as to why the indicated outcome is the most appropriate;
they do not in any-sense recapitulate the internal mental processes that
the judge may have gone through to reach the outcome in his or her own
mind. For this reason, "influence" is not the most apt word. for the
phenomenon I am describing, and I will be using it throughout this
paper in a somewhat extended sense.
In the Anglo-American judicial tradition, however, the favoured
weapon in the explanatory arsenal of judges is a reference to the
decisions (that is, to the logical arguments that have been given as
reasons to explain the outcome) of other judges in previously decided
cases in their own and other courts. This means that the citation
patterns of individual judges and, therefore, of the courts that are the
collegial aggregate of those judges are an important statement of judicial
influence, all the more valuable for the fact that judges have explicitly
acknowledged that influence as part of the rational process that explains
and justifies their actions to their fellow professionals. The preference
for judicial citations in the explanatory process itself distinguishes
Anglo-American judges from their continental European counterparts,
who are more likely to build their own reasons for outcomes around

3 Lord A. Denning, Freedom Under the Law (London: Stevens, 1949).
4 L.M. Friedman et aL, "State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation" (1981) 33
Stan. L. Rev. 773 at 793 [emphasis in original].
5 Ibid. at 794.
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academic textbooks. 6 The extent to which these citations do or do not
cluster around particular courts presents further information about the
sources from which particular judges and benches draw their doctrinal
cues. The prominence or invisibility of current and past members of a
particular court within the lists of preferred citations is a statement
about immediate and enduring influence within that court.
It is this third factor that will be addressed in this article, which
looks at the citation practices of the Supreme Court of Canada by
focusing on its references to its own earlier decisions-these are, to use
Johnson's term, "follow-up citations." 7 Such an analysis will reveal
something about the influence patterns within the Court, and about the
durability of that influence over time.
II. THE THEORY
To begin with the obvious: "[p]resumably a citation means
something to the person citing, and presumably he anticipates that it will
have some meaning to a reader."8 That is, judges may use a specific
citation for a variety of reasons: because of the congruency of factual
situations or legal contexts; because of the rigour of the doctrinal
analysis or the succinctness of its conclusions; because of the status of a
specific judge or a specific court; and, in general terms, because of the
extent to which it will persuade the relevant audience (which is not just
the immediate parties) of the appropriateness of the outcome. When
interviewed about the process, judges tend to play down the degree of
discretion and of individualized choice involved, saying that they cite
only what they need to cite. This is especially true of judges who have
taken the judgment-writing courses which stress brevity and succinctness.
However, even on this description, it remains important and useful to
identify the cases to which judicial practice concedes such need. Indeed,
the more sparing the use of citations, the more important each
individual citation and the greater the intellectual and doctrinal
significance it concedes.
6 See, for example, M.R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); and J.L. Goutal,
"Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S." (1976) 24 Am. J. Comp. Law 43.
For a similar point in a more explicitly Canadian context, see C. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., "By Reason of
Authority or by Authority of Reason" (1993) 27 U.B.C. L Rev. 1.
7 C. Johnson, "Follow-Up Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court" (1986) 39 W. Pol. Q. 538.
8 J.H. Merryman, "The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in
1950" (1954) 6 Stan. L. Rev. 612.
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Judges often suggest that there is little choice involved in
choosing citations-that they cite only what they need to cite, and they
cite it because they need to. Such self-deprecation cannot be taken at
face value, at least not for all cases and least of all for the important
cases that make law. Kerans J. refers to this as the "flat rock theory" of
precedent: reading cases is like turning over rocks, and if you just turn
over enough rocks you will eventually find the exact piece of law you
need. 9 But this denies the creativity whereby a judge persuasively
weaves together strands of precedent to shape a just outcome for the
particular case that will also serve as a guide to future cases, a process
which partakes as much of art as it does of science. Even when they
agree on the outcome, no two judges will fashion exactly the same logical
argument to explain it; this is why it often makes a considerable
difference which judge on the majority delivers the decision, and why
judges who agree on the outcome sometimes find it necessary to muddy
the waters with the complication of a separate concurring judgment.
With some very important qualifications, which will be expanded
upon later, judges use judicial authorities in very much the same way
that an academic uses footnotes: to draw the attention of the reader to a
broader background against which to locate the immediate arguments,
to identify specific passages in other such works for expansion or
containment or criticism, to buttress statements that may seem dubious
or challengeable by linking them to more respected sources, to
acknowledge contributions and innovations and clarifications, to weave
together insights and ideas from a variety of sources, and so on. Just as a
bibliography reveals an author's methodology, assumptions, and
background, so judges reveal something significant about themselves in
the selections they make from the enormous repertoire of precedents
theoretically available within the common law tradition.
Indeed, in academic circles great importance is attached to
citations. Voluminous indices of who is cited by whom and where and
how often are regularly published; 10 in some disciplines, journals are
ranked for prestige in terms of how often their articles are cited in their
own and other journals.1 1 The logic is transparent: articles that are
9 Justice R.P. Kerans, "Standards of Review" (Paper presented at the Canadian Appellate
Court Seminar, April 1993) [unpublished].
10 See, for example, the Social Science Citation Index (Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific

Info., 1995).
11 See, for example, P. Norris & I. Crewe, "The Reputation of Political Science Journals:
Pluralist and Consensus Views" (1993) 41 Pol. Stud. 5; J.P. Lester, "Evaluating the Evaluators:
Accrediting Knowledge and the Ranking of Political Science Journals" (1990) 23 PS: Political
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frequently cited, that have some measurable impact on other work in the
field, and that constitute a landmark around which other writers
navigate are more meritorious than those to which no researcher ever
finds need to refer. Similarly, it seems reasonable to suggest that
frequently cited cases are in some objective sense more important, and
that frequently cited judges are in some sense more significant, than
those whose work, however careful and rigorous, has minimal impact
beyond the immediate case and outcome.
There is a double limitation in the information that can be
derived from the study of citations, judicial or academic. The first is that
it can only measure acknowledged influence; if I choose not to mention
a source from which I have drawn an idea, for example, because of
forgetfulness, outright plagiarism, or a fear that my colleagues will so
disdain the source as to cast doubt upon my work as well, then it will not
appear in my bibliography. The second limitation is that the message
drawn from an acknowledged influence may or may not coincide with
the message that authority meant to convey, or the one that others
typically draw from it (whether it is because of my penetrating analysis,
honest error, or for other reasons from which I would derive less credit).
Nonetheless, it remains true and important that specific sources are
identified, that specific ideas are attributed to them, and that an
explanation is built around these acknowledged contributions.
It is also true that the correlation of citation frequency with merit
works better for academic citations than it does for judicial citations.
The notion of an excellent and ground-breaking academic article that no
other academic ever finds it necessary to refer to is almost an oxymoron,
a contradiction in terms. However, it is much easier to understand why
an excellent judicial decision would almost never be cited: no judge
would find it necessary to cite the Supreme Court's leading case in, for
example, standards of appellate review1 2 unless the question of
standards of review provides an axis around which a specific appeal is
being organized. To make the similar point at a higher level of
generality, private law cases are increasingly unlikely to be cited as the
Supreme Court caseload becomes predominantly focused on public and
criminal law. Somewhat more abstractly, Landes and Posner suggest the
notion of a "superprecedent": "a precedent that is so effective in
defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from
arising in the first place or, if they do arise, induces them to be settled
Science & Politics 445; and J.A. Christenson & L. Sigelman, "Accrediting Knowledge: Journal
Stature and Citation Impact in Social Science" (1985) 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 964.
12
See Lensen v. Lensen, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 672 [hereinafter Lensen].
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without litigation."'13 In other words, there are, at least theoretically,
some cases whose importance is so great that they are never cited.
Although merit is undoubtedly an important component of the judicial
significance reflected in citation practices, this article will begin by
speaking only of the broader concept, and only later will it make even a
preliminary attempt to penetrate this influence in order to isolate merit.
There are two specific features of judicial citation that cannot be
attributed to the more generic practice of citation. The first is the fact
that judicial decisions can be appealed to a higher court-a trial court to
an appeal court, an appeal court to the Supreme Court, and, before
1949, the Supreme Court to the Privy Council-and this, presumably,
creates an important and pragmatically grounded hierarchy of citability,
to which the status rankings of the various journals are not even an
imperfect approximation. The second feature is the fact that stare decisis
is a stronger doctrine with sharper teeth than any academic practice of
recognizing intellectual sources; there is no academic equivalent to the
notion of "binding precedent." To some extent, weaker perhaps in
recent years but nonetheless important, the existence of a prior decision
by a court of relevant jurisdiction is in itself a reason for following the
precedent, completely apart from the persuasive train of logic that it
contains. In Schauer's words, "[tihe bare skeleton of an appeal to
precedent is easily stated: The previous treatment of occurrence X in
manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historicalpedigree,a reason for
'14 This, along with
treating X in manner Y if and when X again occurs.
15
collegial courtesy, may explain why so few judicial citations are critical
or negative; the same is patently untrue of academic citations. However,
neither consideration significantly undermines this enquiry. Because
this analysis focuses on a single court making reference to its own past
decisions, the question of a hierarchy of citability does not come into
play; and because we are (so to speak) counting footprints rather than
trying to indicate how deeply they are sunk into the ground, the question
of whether and how much judicial citations differ from academic ones, of
when a precedent is binding as opposed to merely persuasive, is not
really triggered either.
One possible objection-that judges simply cite the cases that
argued to them by counsel, and that citation frequencies
been
have
13 W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, "Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis"
(1976) 9 J.L. & Econ. 249 at 256.
14
Schauer, supra note 2 at 571 [emphasis in original].
15 Twenty-nine cases out of 4,642, or 0.6 per cent.
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therefore say more about the lawyers that appear before the Supreme
Court than about the judges themselves-should not be given undue
weight. A recent American study16 found that less than half of the legal
authorities cited in a sample of United States appeal decisions were
taken from the arguments of counsel, accounting for only one-sixth of all
citations by counsel; and that in over one-fifth of the cases none of the
authorities emphasized in the judgment were from the arguments of
counsel. Canadian practices are not necessarily parallel; however,
interviews with appeal court judges in Canada similarly suggest that they
are quite prepared to cite cases not submitted to them by counsel and
often do so, although when such a citation is a pivotal element of the
outcome they normally allow counsel the chance to address it through
written submissions. 17
The point that remains is the logical one: in explaining a
particular line of argument or justifying a conclusion, a judge can draw
upon a variety of sources (although sometimes the choice may be rather
narrow, and on occasion it may vanish altogether if there is a recent, and
clear, unanimous Supreme Court decision that is directly to the point).
It follows that the choice of specific citations says something both about
the judge who chose the citation and the judge who delivered the
original decision itself.
The study of citation patterns presupposes that such patterns are
meaningful, that for all their inscrutability to the outsider citations are
used in standardized ways which convey meaning to an identifiable
judicial and legal community, and that the choice of what citation to use
in what place and in what way is often, and to some significant extent,
the product of discretion rather than unambiguously and uniquely
determined by the context. This simply accepts and builds upon the
common observation that it is easier to arrive at an understanding of
what the outcome should be than it is to reach the best explanation of
why this is so; studying the use of citations takes the judges at their word
as they supply reasoned explanations built around the legal resources
they share with their professional colleagues, wrapping even judicial
innovation in precedential continuity. The validity of the inquiry is
reinforced by the phenomenon that Lawlor has referred to as "personal

16

T.B. Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers: Information Gatheringin the Adversary System
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978) at 29.
17
These comments are based on research in progress; for an analysis of an early stage of this
project, see P. McCormick & I. Greene, Judges and Judging: Inside the CanadianJudicial System
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1990).
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stare decisis" 18-the extent to which the judicial profession values
consistency and clarity of judgment, with the result that each judge tries
to show the logical link between the immediate decision and his or her
past decisions.
III. THE DATA
The data on which this analysis is based are drawn from the
reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada over a five-year

period. Specifically, information was gathered on the judicial citations
given by the court in every case reported in the Supreme Court Reports
for the years 1989 through 1993 inclusive; 19 citations within dissents and
separate concurrences are also included. This period includes the first
three-and-one-half years of the current Chief Justiceship of Lamer, as
well as the last eighteen months of Dickson's Chief Justiceship, but the
material will nonetheless be treated as a single block of data; there will
be no attempt to compare or contrast the two Chief Justiceships. It
should be stressed that the data includes all reported cases, not a
random sample, and that since 1970 virtually every decision of the Court
is reported. The patterns that emerge from this analysis can, therefore,
be taken with some confidence as fairly reflecting the overall
performance of the Court over a reasonable span of time.
Over the period indicated, there were 631 reported decisions of
the Court, and they included 4,848 references to the prior decisions of
the Supreme Court, an average of seven or eight such citations per
21
decision. 20 Not every decision included follow-up citations, but the
large majority did, and many included a dozen or more.
Not all citations are of a kind, and it is a drawback of a statistical
approach such as this one that it tends to treat them as if they were.
Most obviously, there is a difference between citing a case in order to
embrace or expand upon the doctrinal ideas it contains and citing a case
in order to reject it. The latter is illustrated by the classic phrase
favoured by the Supreme Court: "this is no longer good law." In
18 R.C. Lawlor, "Personal Stare Decisis" (1968) 41 S.Cal. L. Rev. 73.
19 It is a characteristic of the Supreme Court Reports in recent years that they contain only
those decisions delivered in each calendar year.
20 There were a somewhat larger number of citations to the decisions of courts other than the
Supreme Court of Canada, but a consideration of these is beyond the scope of this article.
21 Indeed, about 10 per cent of all Supreme Court decisions are extremely short, with a bare
paragraph of text and no judicial citations whatever.
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practice, however, less than one-half of 1 per cent of all citations are
negative or critical to such an extent. The distortion resulting from this
factor is therefore minimal. More to the point, there is a difference
between a "substantive" citation, where the citing judge elaborates on
the specific content of the cited case, often to the point of direct
quotation; a "passing" citation, where little more than the style of cause
of the cited case is given, on the apparent assumption that its content
and meaning are already known by the reading public to which it is
directed; and the (until recently) rare "string" citation, 2 2 where a
statement of accepted doctrine is buttressed by a flat list of supporting
citations. This distinction is obviously not unimportant, and it will be
returned to later, but for the moment the simple fact of citation will be
taken as the unit of measure.
IV. CITATIONS AND INFLUENCE: WHICH JUDGES COUNT
Again to begin by stating the obvious: if cases are cited in any
single decision, it is because they provide a focused analysis or a
definitive statement of a critically relevant point of law. A high
frequency of citation for any specific case is therefore two pieces of
information in one: first, it identifies the past cases that are distinguished
by the fact that they provide doctrinal statements of ongoing utility and
importance; and second, it provides an indication of the kind of
questions of law around which the current Supreme Court caseload is in
fact organizing itself.
The 4,848 follow-up citations embraced a total of 1,346 different
prior decisions of the Supreme Court, meaning that the average cited
case was referred to more than three, but less than four times. I have
elsewhere 23 considered the question of which specific cases are referred
to most frequently, of how they resemble each other and differ from the
other decisions of the court, and what they reveal about the operations
of the "influential" Court as distinct from the "routine" Court.
However, for present purposes, I wish to look beyond the specific
individual cases to another equally obvious dimension of citation,
22

The "string" citation is usually seen as a characteristic of American opinion writing: see J.G.

Wetter, The Styles of JudicialAppellate Opinions:A Case Study in ComparativeLaw (Leyden: A.W.

Sythoff, 1960) at 68-69.
23 p. McCormick, "Which Supreme Court Decisions does the Supreme Court Cite?: An
Analysis of Follow-up Citations on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1996) 7 (2d)
Supreme Court L.R. [forthcoming].
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namely that with only a handful of exceptions every single set of "reasons
for judgment" and every single dissent or separate concurring judgment
24
is authored by a single specific and identifiable member of the Court
We can therefore talk, not just about frequently cited cases, but about
frequently cited judges: that is, some judges, more than others, write the
decisions that contain the clarifications of judicial doctrine that visibly
shape the Court's subsequent decisions. This frequency of citation is, to
some extent and with some important qualifications, an identification of
the relative degrees of influence on the current Supreme Court that
current and past members influence; a judge (for example, former Chief
Justice Dickson) who is frequently cited is in some usable and intelligible
sense projecting influence over the current Court, more so than another
judge (for example, Nolan J.) who is seldom or never cited.
This impression is enhanced by the frequency with which the
writing judge is explicitly identified by the citing judge-"as Dickson for
the Court ..." is a surprisingly common phrase. Almost one-half of all

citations include this accompanying reference to the specific judge who
delivered the reasons. This is all the more surprising given the extent to
which judges on the provincial courts of appeal, for example, indicate a
concern for the Court as an institution with a doctrinal focus, rather than
playing up or hinting at divisions within the Court by emphasizing the
doctrinal contributions of specific individuals. Supreme Court decisions
are as likely to refer to "Dickson for the Court" as they are to "the
Court," thereby stressing the individual contribution over the
institutional achievement.
This influence is only partly the product of merit in any hard and
objective sense, and the citation frequency tables that follow should not
be taken in any simple way as measures of ability. How long judges
served on the Court, and therefore how many decisions they have had a
chance to deliver, is clearly a factor; judges like Nolan, Armour, Nesbitt,
or Killam had little opportunity to make an impact, and therefore,
regardless of their ability, they cannot be expected to be cited as
frequently as judges like Martland and R.A. Ritchie, and former Chief
Justices Kerwin and Duff. How recently the judge served is another
factor; as will be discussed later, there is a mathematically quantifiable
"decay rate" in the citability of Supreme Court decisions, and recent
24 This generalization is a little too strong, in that a number of decisions are jointly written by
two (more rarely by three) judges for the majority, other cases are per coram-anonymous and
unanimous-decisions; still others represent seriatim decisions, in which each member of the panel
indicates how he or she would resolve the question without explicitly joining with or departing from

the parallel explanations by their colleagues. These numbers, however, are not large.
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judges carry an obvious and logically defensible advantage. Finally,
there is a "luck of the draw" built into the evolving caseload patterns on
the Supreme Court. As private law cases fade and criminal law cases
expand as a proportion of the total caseload, judges who frequently
delivered private law decisions are disadvantaged, and judges who
frequently delivered criminal law decisions are advantaged, as sources of
relevant citations. Although it is obvious to say that excellent judges are
cited more often than mediocre ones, the operation of these intervening
variables makes citation frequency by itself a highly imperfect means of
assessing merit.
Table I
Most Frequently Cited Judges
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
Judge

Times Cited

Excluding self-cites

Dickson*
Lamer*
Wilson
La Forest
McIntyre
Sopinka
Laskin*
Beetz
McLachlin
W.Z. Estey
L'Heureux-Dub6
R.A. Ritchie
Cory
Le Dain
Martland
Pigeon
Gonthier
Spence
Duff*
Cartwright*
TOTAL

896 [18.5%]
577 [11.9%]
374 [7.7%]
368 [7.6%]
316 [6.5%]
230 [4.7%]
186 [3.8%]
170 [3.5%]
128 [2.6%]
126 [2.6%]
125 [2.6%]
120 [2.5%]
115 [2.4%]
112 [2.3%]
108[2.2%]
82 [1.7%]
64 [1.3%]
54 [1.1%]
52 [1.1%]
51 [1.1%]
4,848

826 [19.5%]
434 [10.3%]
322 [7.6%]
255 [6.0%]
303 [7.2%]
136 [3.2%]
186 [4.4%]
167 [3.9%]
98 [2.3%]
126 [3.0%]
77 [1.8%]
120 [2.8%]
95 [2.2%]
112 [2.6%]
108 [2.6%]
82 [1.9%]
50 [1.2%]
54 [1.3%]
52 [1.2%]
51 [1.2%]
4,234

* Chief Justice.
Note: boldface type indicates a member of the current Court.

The 4,848 previously cited decisions of the Supreme Court were
delivered by more than sixty different members of the Court. Indeed, of
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all the individuals who have ever served on the Court, only nine were not
cited at all during the five-year period. Those nine meet rather obvious
criteria: they served around the turn of the century (Patterson, King, and
Girouard JJ.); they served for very short periods of time (Malouin J.);.or
both (Taschereau, Mills, Armour, Nesbitt, and Killam JJ.); and none
served as Chief Justice. Another twenty-three, generally answering to
similar criteria (but including Richards, Strong, and Fitzpatrick C.JJ.)
were cited five times or less: that is, not more than once per year on
average.
At the other end of the scale, there were twenty judges, one-third
of them from the current Court, who each supplied 1 per cent or more of
the follow-up citations. This cut-off point corresponds to an average of
about ten citations per year and thereby indicates a significant and
continuing influence. The five most frequently cited judges (Dickson
and Lamer C.JJ. and Wilson, La Forest, and McIntyre JJ.) together
accounted for fully one-half of all citations. The prominence of Dickson
C.J. is striking, although a further breakdown for each of the five years
considered would show that his influence is waning slightly, whereas
Lamer C.J.'s is still building. The obvious and straightforward
implication is the relative importance of recency and of the Chief
Justiceship.
Most of the current members of the Court appear on this "top
twenty" list, only Iacobucci and Major JJ. having been appointed so
recently as not to make the 1 per cent cut-off point. The more recent
Chief Justices are also high on the list, reflecting the prominence that
they have enjoyed within their Court,2 5 although it is at first glance
mildly surprising that Laskin C.J. is not cited more often. As well, the
only two individuals who remain on the list more than twenty years after
they left the Court are Chief Justices, including Duff C.J. from before
World War II. Most of the others (R.A. Ritchie, Martland, and Pigeon
JJ.) served on the Court for a considerable period that ended within the
last two decades, suggesting an opportunity to build up a considerable
body of decisions from which citations could be drawn. The enduring
impact of the few individuals who fit none of these three categories
(McIntyre, Wilson, Le Dain, and Spence JJ.) is, therefore, all the more
striking and noteworthy.

25 P. McCormick, "Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of Canada: Towards a
Typology of Chief Justice Performance" (1993) 4 (2d) Supreme Court L.R. 409.
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V. CITATIONS AND INFLUENCE: THE PROBLEM OF SELFCITATION
There is one factor that could help to explain the predominance
of current members of the Court on the citation frequency list, and that
is the fact that current members do (and former members do not) have
the opportunity to cite themselves. Self-citations account for just over
one-twelfth of all citations (614 out of 4,848, or 12.7 per cent), and all
judges who served on the Court between 1989 and 1993 cited their own
decisions proportionately more often than they were cited by the rest of
the Court collectively. The figures are shown in Table II.
Table II

Frequency of Self-Citation
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
Judge

Self-Cites as Percentage

Self-Cites as Percentage

of Cites BY Judge

of Cites oF Judge

Dickson
McIntyre

35.2%
34.2%

8.1%
4.3%

Lamer

25.5%

25.6%

La Forest
Sopinka
Wilson
Gonthier
McLachlin

21.0%
13.2%
12.3%
6.4%
6.3%

31.5%
42.9%
14.5%
23.3%
25.9%

L'Heureux-Dub6

6.2%

40.0%

Cory
Iacobucci

4.8%
3.2%

18.0%
43.8%

It is, of course, perfectly understandable that self-citations
should loom so large within the citation practices of the Court. First,
even the judges who try most conscientiously to stay current with all the
recent decisions of the Court are necessarily and by definition more
familiar with their own decisions than with anyone else's. If the current
case represents a clarification of, or a minor departure from, an earlier
decision by the same judge, then it is appropriate-indeed,
expected-that this will be pointed out. Second, as Lawlor points out,26
26

Lawlor, supra note 18.
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judges, more than the members of any other profession, value
consistency and continuity, and therefore attach great importance to
demonstrating how their present arguments mesh with the ideas that
they have suggested earlier. Both of these considerations help to explain
the relatively high level of self-citations, that is, the frequency with which
judges lead off a judicial citation by writing, "as I said in ... ." To some

extent, this occurs in the context of linking the current opinion to an
earlier dissent or separate concurrence-19.1 per cent of all selfcitations, but only 10.9 per cent of all citations, are to recorded opinions
so much so that we can
other than the decision of the Court-but not
27
practice
the
of
element
defining
a
as
this
take
In terms of assessing influence, the practice of self-citations
seems to present a double difficulty. First, it suggests an uneven playing
field: only current members of the Court can cite themselves in current
decisions of the Court, and the citation frequency of former members
enjoys no comparable built-in boost. Second, the logic of this study is to
consider the influence on current judicial decisions that is reflected in
the citation of previous decisions of the Court, and it seems strange to
talk of judges influencing themselves. That is, if Judge X cites Judge Y,
then it makes sense to say that Judge X was influenced by Judge Y's
ideas and arguments, but if Judge X cites Judge X, then "influence" no
longer seems the appropriate word.
To deal with these problems in reverse order: the problem of
"self-influence" largely disappears if we unfold the term "influence" for
present purposes into something rather more ponderous, such as
"making a doctrinal contribution in terms of which subsequent decisions
are explicitly justified." Some Supreme Court decisions-for example,
R. v. Oakes,28 by far the most frequently cited single case over the fiveyear period-represent a seminal contribution to the resolution of a
critical legal issue, in this case the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms29 and the logical process whereby the
courts will apply it. It carries this latter significance whenever it is cited,
and it makes no practical difference whether the citation is by Dickson
27

It is also intriguing that some judges, such as R.A. Ritchie J. (2.5 per cent), Martland J. (2.8

per cent), and Dickson C.J. (4.7 per cent), are almost never cited except when delivering the
decision of the Court, whereas others, such as L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (28.0 per cent), Wilson J. (20.1

per cent), McLachlin J. (18.1 per cent), and La Forest J. (16.8 per cent), are often cited when
dissenting or delivering a separate concurring opinion.
28 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
29

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,

c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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C.J. (who wrote the reasons for judgment for the Court) or by any other
member of the Court. The problem of the uneven playing field is
answered by the simple fact that it almost never makes a difference to
the calculations and rankings discussed in this paper; when such a
difference does exist, it will be indicated.
VI. CITATIONS AND INFLUENCE: CORRECTING FOR THE
TIME FACTOR
In one sense, Table I explains itself: the citation patterns reflect
how much influence each specific judge has had on the collective
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court over the last five years, in the form
of an explicit citation to their reasons for judgment by the judge writing a
subsequent decision. But the extent to which we can infer any table of
merit corresponding to the list is dubious since recency is clearly a
powerful factor-so much so that it seems clearly to off-set, arguably
even to overwhelm, considerations of quality. To adopt an obvious
metaphor: if we think of the decision-making performance of the Court
as a flat surface which is receiving light from a variety of jurisprudential
sources, then the table shows how much light is being received from each
of those sources, and if you are trying to read a newspaper, all you need
to know is how much light you are getting. However, not all the sources
are transmitting from the same distance or with the same initial
brightness. The fact that the less distant sources are supplying most of
the received light does not of itself prove that they are intrinsically
brighter, and if you want to know something about the stars as sources of
light, this is what you need to know.
The metaphor can also be turned around: if we know the relative
distance at which the light sources are located, we can work out the
relative brightness with which they must be transmitting in order to
deliver that much light. By extension, if we know how far away in time
each judge is from the cases that register judicial influence, and if we
know the mathematical function that expresses how this time-distance
erodes influence, then we can compare the influence generated by each
of those judges. Table I measures judicial "influence" considered as an
input to the decision making of the current court, but it can also serve as
the basis for calculating measures of judicial influence considered as an
output from the judges who are being cited.
The question then becomes how best to discount citations
against time. The most tempting possibility is to treat the age decay as
linear; if this were so, then the product of number of citations times
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average age of citations would itself be a simple measure of "influence as
output." A linear decline, however, is unlikely. It is difficult to imagine
what calculations on the part of decision-making judges would lead a
case to be cited one or two fewer times each year until it simply vanishes
from sight. As an alternative approach, the light metaphor is also
tempting and suggests its own mathematical model: it is a scientific fact
that brightness varies inversely as the square of the distance, and this
suggests that we could create an influence score for each judge which is
the product of the number of citations and the square of the average age
of those citations. This, however, is too steep a curve because the
citation rates simply do not decay that quickly. If a straight count
exaggerates the influence of recent judges, an age-squared count would
unduly exaggerate the influence of judges more remote in time.
Figure 1: Frequency by Age of Citation: Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
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Figure 1 examines citations in terms of the length of time
between the cited and the citing case, measured in years. This is a
straightforward decay curve, and experimenting with various possibilities
results in a rate of decay of about 15 per cent, represented by the smooth
curve. The largest number of citations are made to cases that have been
decided within the year previous to the citing decision. Citations to
cases that are between one and two years old are only 85 per cent as
common, the frequency of citations to cases between two and three years
old only 85 per cent as common as that, and so on. Thus, for every one
hundred citations to a one-year old case, there will be eighty-five to a
two-year old case, seventy-two to a three-year old case, sixty-one to a
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two-year old case, seventy-two to a three-year old case, sixty-one to a
four-year old case, and so on. That "half-life" of the normal Supreme
Court citation-that is, the number of years that it takes for this
standard decay curve to cut the number of citations in half-is therefore
just over four years. This drop-off rate is surprisingly sharp; Merryman's
study of the citation practices of the California State Supreme Court in
1950, 1960, and 1970 (admittedly based on a rather different
methodology) suggested a half-life closer to a decade.30
But if the rate of decay is sufficiently solid and predictable, then
it becomes a discount rate that can be applied to every single citation,
"correcting" for the factor of age. The influence score for each citation
is therefore 1.176 (that is: 1/0.85) raised to the "n'th power, where 'n' is
the age of the cite in years."31 To compare the influence of judges, we
would then use not a simple citation count, but rather the weighted total
whereby citations from cases more remote in time are given greater
weight. The results are shown in Table III, and the pattern they suggest
is somewhat different from the simple count in Table I.
The rankings implied by these "influence scores" seem intuitively
more satisfying as indicators of "influence as output." Dickson C.J.
remains top of the list, but Laskin C.J. rises from eighth to a solid third,
whereas pre-WWII Chief Justice Duff (celebrated by some
contemporaries as the greatest judicial mind in the history of the
Court)3 2 vaults into second place. In general, Chief Justices dominate
Table III even more dramatically than they do Table I; eleven of the
twenty-five most influential justices, including eight of the top twelve,
capped their career by occupying the centre chair. Conversely, the
advantage of recency is so sharply offset that no member of the current
Court, other than Lamer C.J. and La Forest J., makes the list. Almost
certainly, this is largely a function of the way that rapid turnover has
created a "Court of Juniors" and should not be generalized; in a more
30 J.H. Merryman, "Towards a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation
Practices of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970" (1977) 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381 at
394-95.
31 The value is computed for each citation individually, not for each judge's average. For
reasons of simplification, the rule is qualified by two considerations: first, no citation receives a
score higher than its age in years; and second, no citation receives a score higher than forty.
32 See J.G. Snell & F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada:History of the Institution
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1985) at 122-3 and 146; I. Bushnell, The Captive Court:A Study of
the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1992) at 256; W.K.
Cambell, "The Right Honourable Sir Lyman Poore Duff, P.C., G.C.M.G.: The Man as I Knew
Him" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 243; and G. Le Dain, "Sir Lyman Duff and the Consitution"
(1974) 12 Osgoode Hall LJ.261.
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normal situation, with a more normal distribution of seniority across the
Court, influence patterns would be less skewed away from current
members. The high ranking for Rand J. will be satisfying to those who
found his approach to the Supreme Court's role distinctive and
innovative, a refreshing change from the mechanical approach that long
dominated Supreme Court jurisprudence. 33
Table I
Influence Scores for Cited Judges
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
Judge
Dickson*
Duff*
Laskin*
Rand
R.A. Ritchie
Martland
Kerwin*
Cartwright*
Fauteux*
Lamer*
Anglin*
Pigeon
Spence
McIntyre
Rinfret*
Beetz
Taschereau*
Wilson
Judson
Hall
Locke
Kellock
La Forest
W.Z. Estey
W.J. Ritchie*

Times Cited

Average Cite Age

Influence Score

896
52
186
48
120
108
41
51
44
577
28
82
54
316
20
170
20
374
26
27
17
15
368
126
11

6.0
58.0
13.4
37.4
16.2
17.6
38.8
28.9
27.7
3.6
68.0
15.2
19.3
5.4
52.5
7.5
39.9
3.4
26.3
22.8
35.9
39.7
2.5
8.2
102.0

3,158
2,080
1,862
1,750
1,690
1,688
1,487
1,468
1,203
1,167
1,120
1,002
946
857
796
780
734
698
683
614
604
582
578
538
440

* Chief Justice.

It is interesting that almost one-quarter of the twenty-five most
influential justices (although only a tenth of the top ten) come from
Quebec. The three most recent French-Canadian Chief Justices all
33 See, for example, Bushnell, supranote 32.
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appear on the list; Pigeon J. is one of the top twelve, and Beetz J. also
shows an enduring influence. Given that less than one-quarter of the
Supreme Court caseload comes in the form of appeals from Quebec, the
double disadvantage of language and of the differences between
common law and civil code clearly handicaps the full participation of the
Quebec judges, but not so much so as to prevent them from making a
significant and enduring contribution to the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. Drawing up a "top nine" list-an "all-star Supreme
Court" if you will-gives Dickson C.J. from Manitoba as Chief Justice
with Duff C.J. from British Columbia, Rand J. from the Atlantic
provinces, Laskin, Kerwin, and Cartwright C.JJ. from Ontario, and
Fauteux C.J., Lamer C.J., and Pigeon J. from Quebec. (R.A. Ritchie
and Martland JJ. would qualify for the top nine on the basis of their
influence score, but are excluded for regional representation
considerations).
VII. CITING JUDGES AND CITING CASES
However, this is still not the complete story. As alluded to
earlier, not all citations are of a type. To consider only two relevant
considerations: some citations identify a specific Supreme Court justice
by name whereas others identify only the case;3 4 and some citations
involve explicit consideration of specific points (and possibly direct
quotations) from the earlier decision, whereas others do not. Not too
surprisingly, there is a considerable overlap between these two
distinctions, and for present purposes I will treat them as crudely
interchangeable. 35 To be specific, I will assume that a citation which
34 This again distinguishes the citation modes of judges from that of academics. It makes no
sense for me to preface a quote with the comment, "as the Canadian Journalof PoliticalScience
says," and leave it to the curious to work out who actually wrote the article in question; but it makes
a good deal of sense for a judge to say, "as this Court has already indicated," without feeling any
need to specify which current or past member the Court did the indicating. Because judges have
this choice, it makes sense to examine how they use it.
35
This is a slight oversimplification. The coding process was intended to distinguish between
"substantive" and "passing" citations, but my students reported that although there are obvious
examples of both types, in practice, citations fall along a continuum between the two with no
obvious dividing line. We noted that well over 90 per cent of named citations involved some
discussion of the content of the earlier decision, and that well over 90 per cent of the clear-cut
passing citations did not involve the name of a specific judge. This careful wording implies a third
category: unnamed citations accompanied by at least some substantive discussion of the case. These
citations comprise just under one-quarter of all citations. Lacking more objective and operable
categories, "named citations" shall be treated as an under-inclusive surrogate for "substantive
citations" for the purposes of this article.
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explicitly names a judge concedes greater significance to that judge than
a citation which simply identifies the case and leaves it to further
research to identify the individual who authored it. Put less bluntly,
given that the judges on the current Court identify previous judges by
name about one-half of the time, I assume that it is a matter of conscious
choice whether they supply the name or not, and that the intention is to
acknowledge the reputation of that judge in that particular area of law
and thereby to acknowledge his or her significance as an expositor of
doctrine. Conversely, the conscious decision not to mention the name
either concedes that the point contributed is of less significance in the
immediate case, or that the judge's name would not add to the weight
that the reader would otherwise be prepared to assign to the citation.
To paraphrase White, my suggestion is that if a judge is named, this will
usually be because his or her36opinions carry with them greater authority
because they are his or hers.
Table IV
Citation Practices: Frequency of Named Citation by Citing Justice
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993

Judge

Cases Cited

Times Judges Cited

Named Cites as %
of Total

Wilson

432

226

52.3%

L'Heureux-Dub6
Cory
Stevenson
Iacobucci
McIntyre
Lamer
McLachlin

774
420
71
219
38
561
474

383
196
33
100
17
250
204

49.5%
46.7%
46.5%
45.7%
44.7%
44.6%
43.0%

La Forest

539

221

41.0%

Gonthier
Dickson
Sopinka
TOTAL

219
199
711
4,740 a

88
279
78
2,132b

40.2%
39.2%
39.2%
45.0%

a Omitsper coram and seriatim decisions cited.

b Includes named decisions inpercoram decisions.

36 G.E. white, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1993) at 305.
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Table IV strongly suggests that the balance between named and
unnamed citations is a function of the style of the current Court as a
whole rather than of the performance of distinct and sharply
differentiated blocs within the Court. Wilson J. was more likely than any
other member of the Court to provide the name of the judge when
referring to a decision; Dickson C.J. and Sopinka J. have been the least
likely to do so, but none of them varies from the Court's overall average
by more than 10 per cent. This similarity entitles us to assume that there
is some high degree of continuity in what the judges intend to convey by
providing (or not providing) the specific name, and that the proportions
between the two groups are roughly comparable regardless of which
current judge is delivering the decision. There is, however, much less
consistency in terms of what proportion of a cited judge's decision are
accompanied by a specific reference to his or her name. Taking the 10
per cent variation rate as establishing the limits of the normal band,
there are five of the reasonably frequently cited judges who are named
proportionately more often than we might expect; these are Rand J. (69
per cent), W.Z. Estey J. (58 per cent), Le Dain J. (58 per cent), Wilson J.
(57 per cent), and de Grandpr6 J. (56 per cent). Conversely, there are
five judges who were named proportionately less often than we might
expect from the overall pattern, these being Kerwin C.J. (17 per cent),
Martland J. (28 per cent), R.A. Ritchie J. (30 per cent), Fauteux C.J. (32
per cent), and Sopinka J. (34 per cent). These differences are striking;
to consider the two extremes, Rand and W.Z. Estey JJ. were both cited
between 40 and 50 times, but Rand J. was named 33 times (in 48 cites)
whereas Kerwin C.J. was named only 7 times (in 41 cites). This
combination of a relative consistency among the citing judges and a
significant variation among the cited judges can be understood as
confirming the hypothesis that there is a persisting, intentional, and
intelligible distinction that needs to be taken into account.
On the question of how to translate these differences into
numeric terms, I propose a crude but straightforward weighting. I will
assume that citations of Supreme Court decisions that are accompanied
by an explicit identification of their author (and which in practice are
usually accompanied by some discussion of the case and its meaning)
will carry double the significance of a "normal" citation. In contrast,
those citations without such explicit identification (and which in practice
tend to be flat listings of the style of cause without substantive
discussion) will carry one-half the significance of a "normal" citation.
This process helps to distinguish those judges whose names live on and
are connected with specific doctrines, from those whose contributions
are transmitted more anonymously. As shown in Table V, the impact of
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this further refinement is modest, but not for that reason unimportant.
Most obviously, Rand J. moves even higher on the table, whereas
Kerwin C.J. fades from sight to be replaced, rather surprisingly, by
Anglin C.J. who led the Court during the first third of this century.
Table V
Revised Influence Scores for Cited Judges, Emphasizing Name Citations
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
Judge

Named Cites as %

Revised Influence Score

Dickson*
Rand
Duff*
Laskin*
R.A. Ritchie
Martland
Cartwright*
Lamer*
Fauteux*
Pigeon
Anglin*

46.2%
68.8%
44.2%
43.0%
30.0%
27.8%
37.3%
43.2%
31.8%
46.3%
35.7%

Influence per
Year on S.C.C.

of All Cites
3,968
2,679
2,420
2,209
1,667
1,563
1,548
1,386
1,239
1,206
1,160

230.0
167.4
65.0
157.8
65.2
64.9
76.4
100.8
51.6
97.1
48.3

Kerwin*

17.1%

1,147

14.7

Taschereau*
Spence
McIntyre
Wilson
Beetz
Rinfret*
W.Z. Estey
La Forest
Locke
Judson
Mignault
Kellock
W.J. Ritchie*

65.0%
38.9%
44.6%
57.0%
50.6%
40.0%
57.9%
48.9%
47.1%
26.9%
54.5%
33.3%
45.5%

1,066
1,042
948
935
929
878
734
728
726
617
580
579
520

38.7
66.9
93.3
105.9
63.0
29.5
69.4
80.9
47.6
31.6
53.1
43.7
30.6

* Chief Justice.

VIII. CITATIONS AND INFLUENCE: CORRECTING FOR
LENGTH OF SERVICE
The right-hand column in Table V further attempts to correct
"influence as output" in terms of another factor that is clearly relevant,
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namely the length of service on the bench. Duff C.J. served on the
Supreme Court bench longer than has any other individual, a total of
more than thirty-seven years; Wilson J., on the other hand, served for

less than nine years, less than anyone else on the "top twenty-five" list.
Even if everything else were equal (as, of course, it never is), this factor

alone would clearly imply a greater opportunity for Duff C.J. to exert
influence and, thereby, to earn a more visible presence in the current
Court's citation practices. Dividing the influence score by the length of

service on the Supreme Court bench creates new figures (influence per
year) which suggest that the impact of Duff C.J. may be to some extent a
function of his lengthy service, whereas that of Lamer C.J., and of
McIntyre and Wilson JJ. may be the more noteworthy for having
overcome the handicap of relatively short service on the Court. Even
more striking is the situation of de Grandpr6 J., whose brief period of
service on the bench is nonetheless generating enough citations from the
current Court for an "influence per year" rating of ninety, putting him in
the top half-dozen of the justices on this measure.
With some reservations because of its more abstract nature, this
"influence generated per year on the bench" measure probably comes
the closest to assessing merit simpliciter, correcting as it does for both
length and recency of service. Pushing harder than the provisional
nature of the calculations may permit, we tentatively suggest a "Super
Court" including the nine judges with the highest "influence generated
per year of service" score. Such a Court would include:'Laskin C.J.,
Wilson, and Le Dain JJ. (Cartwright C.J. is narrowly edged out for the
third slot) from Ontario; Lamer C.J., de Grandpr6, and Pigeon JJ. from
Quebec; Rand J. from the Maritimes; Dickson C.J. from the Prairies;
and McIntyre J. from British Columbia. On the basis of this score, the
Chief Justice would be Dickson C.J. It is rather striking that the "top
nine" neatly match the regional quotas (statutory for Quebec, customary
for the other regions) that guide appointments to the Court. Also,
correcting for length of service on the bench changed less than half of
the positions-McIntyre J. replaces Duff C.J., Wilson and Le Dain JJ.
replace Cartwright and Anglin C.JJ., and de Grandpr6 J. replaces
Fauteux C.J. 37

37 From the limited feedback I have received, I gather that the inclusion of de Grandpr6 J. is,

at first glance, the most surprising. Therefore, I would supplement it with the following comments:
serving on the Court for less than four years in the mid 1970s, de Grandpr6 J. delivered fourteen
decisions that were still being cited by the Court fifteen years later, and eleven of those were
specifically linked to his name. He was cited by nine different members of the Court, L'HeureuxDub6 J. doing so most often and Dickson CJ. least often. Based on the reasons for judgment which
cited him, his important contributions include the following: the "first enunciation," in Committee
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Table VI
The "Super Court": Influence as Measured by Frequency of Citations
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993

Total Influence a

Influence per Year on Bench

Dickson CJ. (Manitoba)

Dickson C.J. (Manitoba)

Rand (New Brunswick)
Duff (British Columbia)
Laskin (Ontario)
Cartwright (Quebec)
Lamer (Quebec)
Fauteux (Quebec)
Pigeon (Quebec)
Anglin (Ontario)

Rand (New Brunswick)
Laskin (Ontario)
de Grandpr6 (Quebec)
Wilson (Ontario)
Lamer (Quebec) b
Pigeon (Quebec)
McIntyre (British Columbia)
Le Dain (Ontario)

a Martland (Alberta) and RA Ritchie (Nova Scotia) scored in the top nine but are excluded
because of regional considerations.
b If self-citations are excluded, Rinfret (Quebec) replaces Lamer (Quebec).

IX. CITATIONS AND INFLUENCE: IDENTIFYING SUBFIELDS

OF LAW
A further simplification is built into the analysis above,
specifically the extent to which it conflates the judicial influence revealed
by citation patterns into a single aggregate, even though it is almost
certainly the case that the patterns will in all respects-the balance
between follow-up and other citations, the average age of citations and
for Justice and Liberty v. Canada(Nat'! Energy Bd.), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 [hereinafter Committee for
Justice], of the doctrine subsequently adopted by the Court regarding the test for the apprehension
of bias, which was the foundation of the Court's Charterdecisions in Valente v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R.
673, and R. v. Lipp4 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114, of the modem doctrine of judicial independence; a clear
statement, in Taisky v. Talsky, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 292 [hereinafter Talsky], of the standards of appellate
review, linked with (and seen as directly contributing to) Dickson CJ.'sLensen decision, supra note
12, and also, again in Committeefor Justice, a good statement, until it was supplanted by cup, Local
963 v. N.B. Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, of the standard of judicial review of an administrative
tribunal; the best statement, in Ct6 v. R, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 8 at 13, of one of the central principles
regarding the indictment procedure, namely: "the golden rule is for the accused to be reasonably
informed of the transaction alleged against him;" one of the first statements, in Taisky, of the notion
of "the welfare of the child" which replaced the "tender years" doctrine in child custody cases; the
clearest statement by the Court, in Mercure v. Marquette & Fils, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 547, of the role of a
trustee in bankruptcy as representing the creditors; and a good discussion in Commerce & Industry
Insurance Co. v. Westend Investment Co., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1036, of the implications for the
interpretation of legislation directly copied from foreign legislation. Considering de Grandpr6 J's
short service on the Court, this seems to represent a creditable contribution; whether he could have
sustained such a pace for a longer period is clearly impossible to answer.
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standard decay curve, the most frequently cited judges-be different for
different areas of law: criminal law as distinct from public law as distinct
from private law and so on. Although the Supreme Court is formally a
generalist Court, it would be naive to expect that the expertise of
individual judges (whether it was brought to the bench or acquired from
lengthy service on the Court) would not leave some imprint on decision
making and citation practices, would not yield names distinguished in tax
law or insurance law but much less so on criminal matters.
For present purposes-in the interests of straightforward
objectivity of the coding process on the one hand, and of ensuring
sufficiently large blocs of cases for meaningful analysis on the other-the
categorization will remain fairly general. The most normal and
straightforward division of the judicial docket in Canada is between
criminal cases and civil cases; since the latter is something of a residual
category, it can usefully be divided between "private law" and "public
law" cases, the latter defined as non-criminal matters to which the
government in an official capacity is a party. Finally, Charter cases can
be broken out as a fourth category, drawn largely but not entirely from
the criminal caseload; although Chartercases are always some other kind
of case as well (often criminal, sometimes public, rarely private), they
38
will for present purposes be treated as Chartercases only.
As shown in Table VII, there are indeed striking differences in
the follow-up citation practices of the Supreme Court for each of the
four broad types of law that have been distinguished. In general terms,
there are several important messages that emerge from those figures.
The first (rather unsurprisingly) is the importance of Chartercases within
the recent jurisprudence of the Court, accounting for almost one-quarter
of the total caseload and for over one-half of the total number of followup citations. If there is in the aggregate some correlation between the
number of judicial citations and the amount of research and writing time
that have gone into any group of decisions, this suggests that the
Supreme Court is expending the largest part of its energies on the
evolution of Charterjurisprudence, with the concomitant implication
that judicial influence within this area is in some sense more important
than influence in other areas.
38 It is not always straightforward whether a specific Supreme Court case should be
considered a Charter case. For present purposes, the list of Charter cases is taken from: F.L.
Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, "The First Decade of the Charter of Rights, 1982-1992: A
Statistical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions" (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association, 12-14 June 1994) [unpublished]. See also F.L. Morton, T.
Riddell & P.H. Russell, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis of
the First.Decade, 1982-1992" (1994) 5 NJ.C.L. 1.

The S.C.C. Cites the S.C.C.

1995]

Table VII
General Characteristics of Follow-up Citations by Case Type
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993

Cases
Citations
Average Age
Median Age
Decay Rate
Half-Life

Charter

Public

Criminal

Private

164
2,401
6.8 years
3.6 years
17.5%
3.6 years

117
1,056
12.8 years
7.0 years
10%
6.6 years

210
764
10.4 years
5.6 years
15%
4.3 years

123
627
15.9 years
9.4 years
8%
8.3 years

The second message relates to the large number of criminal
cases, the largest of the four categories, and one that looms larger when
remembered that most Chartercases have arisen in the context of
criminal cases. This is a recent feature of the Supreme Court caseload,
applying only to the Dickson and the Lamer Courts. On the recent
Supreme Court, but not on earlier Supreme Courts, criminal law
jurisprudence has been a large part of its work, and judicial influence in
this subfield is correspondingly important. At the same time, however,
the ratio of follow-up citations to the total number of cases suggests that
much of this element of the caseload is rather routine in nature and
involves little contribution to legal doctrine. Wold and Caldeira 9 have
written about the surprisingly high proportion of routine matters within
the caseload of even those courts that can control their own docket, and
even a casual perusal of the Supreme CourtReports reveals enough oneparagraph decisions dismissing appeals "for the reasons given in the
court below" to confirm that this is true of the Supreme Court of
Canada as well.
The third implication, and the converse of the observation about
the growing importance of the criminal caseload, is the very low number
of private law appeals. As recently as the Fauteux Court, such cases
constituted more than half of all the cases heard by the Supreme Court.
Even under Laskin's Chief Justiceship (in this as in many other regards
the important transition point for the Court), criminal cases were still

39 J.T. Wold, "Going through the motions: the monotony of appellate court decisionmaking"
(1978-79) 62 Judicature 58; and J.T.Wold & G.A. Caldeira, "Perceptions of 'Routine' DecisionMaking in Five California Courts of Appeal" (1980) 13 Polity 334.
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the largest of the four categories. 40 At the same time, the ratio of
citations to cases suggests that the numbers do not understate the
relative importance of private law cases within the caseload, while the
much higher average and median ages for citations suggest a more
leisurely approach to doctrinal evolution.
The fourth point relates to the public law component, the
smallest of the four in terms of the number of cases but the second
largest in terms of follow-up citations. Arguably, this combines with the
high profile of Chartercases to reinforce the observations of Monahan 41
and Gibson 42 concerning the extent to which the Supreme Court of
Canada has become a public law court, leaving other legal issues
primarily to the attention of the provincial courts of appeal. At the same
time, the relatively high average and median ages for citations suggests a
much greater willingness to draw on earlier Court doctrine and, hence,
to be influenced by the members of earlier Courts.
As might be expected, the patterns of judicial influence-both of
total influence scores and of influence generated per year on the
bench 43 -are quite different for each of the four areas of law. Table
VIII indicates the top nine judges for each of the four subfields,
generated on the basis of total influence and influence per year; Table
IX assembles the same information in a more visually immediate way. It
should be remembered that the total number of citations and, therefore,
both the relative importance of each area within the recent Court's
jurisprudence and the reliability of the numbers generated, decline fairly
sharply as one moves from the left side of the table to the right.
Similarly (because of the methodological problems of multiplying a very
small number of cases by a very large adjustment factor to generate the
influence score), only judges with at least half a dozen citations are
included in the tables, a caveat that can be seen either as unfairly
handicapping judges from the earlier Courts or as preventing their
heavily weighted citations from distorting a reasonable reading of the
patterns.
40 p. McCormick, "The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: Analysis of
Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990" (1992) 3 (2d) Supreme Court L.R.,
especially Table 2 at 7.
41 P. Monahan, Politicsand the Constitution: The Charter,Federalism and the Supreme Court of

Canada(Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1987) c. 2.
42 D. Gibson, "The Crumbling Pyramid: Constitutional Appeal Rights in Canada" (1989) 38
U.N.B. LJ.1.
43 For each of the four areas, the citations for each subfield of law are treated separately and
their scores are recalculated on the basis of the appropriate decay rate, as indicated in Table VII.
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Table VIII
The "Super Court": Influence Measured by Citation Frequency by Type of Case
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993

Influence Score

Influence per
Year on Bench

Charter

Public

Criminal

Private

Dickson
Rand
Lamer
Duff
Laskin
Fauteux
Wilson
Kellock
Beetz

Duff
Rand
Anglin
Dickson
Taschereau
Laskin
Mignault
Kerwin
Beetz

Cartwright
Dickson
Spence
Kerwin
R.A. Ritchie
Lamer
McIntyre
Fauteux
Pigeon

Dickson
Duff
Wilson
Anglin
W.Z. Estey
Pigeon
R.A. Ritchie
Rinfret
Beetz

Dickson
Lamer
Rand
Wilson
Le Dain
de Grandpr6
McIntyre
Laskin
Fauteux

Rand
Laskin
Dickson
Duff
Anglin
Taschereau
Beetz
W.Z. Estey
Pigeon

Dickson
Cartwright
Spence
de Grandpr6
McIntyre
Lamer
Kerwin
Pigeon
R.A. Ritchie

Wilson
Dickson
La Forest
W.Z. Estey
Le Dain
Pigeon
McLachlin
Gonthier
Beetz

Note: Minimum five citations within category for judge to make list.

Even breaking the patterns down into these several subfields,

Dickson C.J. continues to stand out; he is the only individual to place
among the top nine on all eight lists, and the only individual to top as
many as four of them 44 Dickson C.J.'s influence is particularly strong in
the Charterand criminal areas, 45 his influence is rather more muted, but
still significant, in the areas of public law and private law.
Another individual who figures very prominently is Duff C.J.,
who appears on four lists and tops one of them. His enduring influence
is most striking in the area of public law, least evident in the area of
criminal law. Given that Duff C.J. left the Court before the end of
World War II, and that his influence score in public law is still higher
than that of any other judge (and remains within the top four even when
44 This prominence, combined with regional considerations, deny Martland J. any credit;
otherwise Martland J. would have placed among the top nine on two lists and tenth on a third, but
well behind fellow Westerner Dickson CJ. each time.
45 For current purposes, these represent two different blocs of cases.
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corrected for his very long service on the bench), there is clearly some
support for his contemporary reputation as the most brilliant jurist to
serve on the Supreme Court. At the other end of the country, Rand J.
stands out for the frequency of his citations in Charter and criminal law,
whereas R.A. Ritchie and La Forest JJ. share the Atlantic
representation for criminal and private law areas respectively. La Forest
J.-would have made two more of the "top nine'" lists had it not been for
regional representation considerations.
Table IX
The "Super Court": Influence Measured by Citation Frequency by Type of Case
Supreme Court Decisions, 1989-1993
Judge

Charter
Infl. Infl./Yr

Ontario
Laskin
Wilson
Kerwin
W.Z. Estey
Anglin
Cartwright
Spence
Le Dain
Kellock

x

x

B.C.
Duff
McIntyre
McLachlin
Atlantic
Rand
R.A. Ritchie
La Forest

Criminal
Intl. Infl.fYr.

Private
Infl. Infl.IYr.

x

Quebec
Pigeon
Beetz
Lamer
Fauteux
de Grandpr6
Taschereau
Rinfret
Gonthier
West
Dickson

Public
Infl. Infl.IYr.

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
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Among the Ontario judges, Laskin C.J. and Wilson J. each
appear on four lists, closely followed by Anglin and Kerwin C.J., and
W.Z. Estey J. with three appearances each. Cartwright C.J. and Spence
J. both exhibit continuing influence on criminal law. However, Ontario
judges crowd the top half of the influence list only for criminal (and
possibly for private) law, featuring much less prominently in the other
areas. Although it has contributed a number of strong judges, Ontario
clearly has not dominated the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
Canada to anything like the extent that, for example, New South Wales
has dominated the Australian High Court 46
Pigeon J. leads the Quebec judges by making six lists, whereas
Beetz J. has five appearances, numbers that are exceeded only by
Dickson C.J.'s perfect score. Lamer C.J. appears on four lists, but the
fact that he is still an active member on the Court suggests that his
influence still has not peaked-the more so as his influence is strongest
in the Charter and criminal areas that dominate the workload of the
modern Court. Fauteux C.J. is also prominent, whereas de Grandpr6 J.
scores well in terms of influence per year, suggesting that his potential
impact has been significantly undercut by his relatively short period on
the bench.
Ten of the twenty-four individuals who made at least one of the
lists were Chief Justices, and they account for thirty-four of the seventytwo list appearances. This is only to be expected as the joint product of
two tendencies: first, since the time of Laskin's Court (and possibly since
that of Cartwright C.J.'s) the Chief Justice has tended to dominate the
delivery of decisions by the Court; and second, with only a handful of
exceptions, the Chief Justiceship has gone to the senior member of the
Court subject to a Quebec/other alternation, which means that the
Chiefs are never "short-term" members of the Court and normally have
enjoyed a lengthy period of service over which to make an impact on the
Court's jurisprudence. 47 Conversely, the effect of generating influence
scores that weight older citations more heavily is to exclude almost all of
the current Court from any of the lists. Apart from Lamer C.J., who is
clearly making a major mark on Court doctrine, only La Forest,

See B. Galligan, The Politics of the High Court:A Study of the JudicialBranch of Government
in Australia (New York: University of Queensland Press, 1987).
47 The average length of service for justices on the Supreme Court is 9.9 years. Chief Justices
serve for 23 years, on average. Martland and R.A. Ritchie JJ. are the only two justices to have
exceeded the average length of service without having becoming Chief Justice. These data do not
include the current members.
46
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McLachlin, and Gonthier JJ. make any of the lists, and all three are in
the low-priority and low-citing area of private law.
X. CONCLUSION
The suggestion has been that the citation practices of the
Supreme Court of Canada provide an objective basis for assessing the
enduring influence of the current and previous members of the Court.
The explanatory practices of the Supreme Court demonstrate the
ongoing importance of judicial citations, with about fifteen citations per
case (almost half of them to prior decisions of the Supreme Court). The
act of citation indicates a choice by the citing judge between alternative
explanatory models and devices, accompanied by the decision to
explicitly acknowledge the contribution. It is therefore a useful,
objective, and intellectually transparent indication both of judicial
influence and of a contribution to the judicial doctrine whereby the
Supreme Court explains and legitimates its decisions.
Looking at all cited cases, Dickson and Lamer C.JJ. were by far
the most frequently cited judges, with Wilson, McIntyre, and La Forest
JJ. constituting a strong second rank; however, the straight citation
count was heavily weighted in favour of current and recent members of
the Court. Applying an appropriate discount to older citations
generated a more complex influence pattern, heavily focused on Chief
Justices and on some of the more long-serving members of the Court; a
correction for the varying lengths of service on the Supreme Court
bench cast some doubt on relative rankings while confirming the impact
of Dickson and Laskin C.JJ., among others.
What emerges from all three approaches-identifying how often
each judge is cited, turning citation frequencies into influence scores,
and correcting for length of service on the bench-is the same general
observation on the steepness of curve, the high drop-off rates for citation
frequencies over time for individual cases, and individual members of
the Court alike. The products sold in the Supreme Court "supermarket"
have a short shelf-life; individual items become stale-dated more than
twice as fast as seems to be the case for the California State Supreme
Court in the 1970S48 (although it is unclear whether this contrasts
Canadian experience with American, national supreme court with
state/province supreme court, or the 1990s with the 1970s). The high
replacement rate for frequently cited cases and the rapid decline from
48

Merryman, supra note 30.
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prominence of cases barely a decade old suggest that the Court is
providing a rapidly evolving jurisprudence attuned to modern realities,
but one that sits strangely with the assumption that judicial precedent
and stare decisis imply a degree of permanence and an implicit and
unavoidable focus on the (sometimes rather remote) past. One
implication of this tendency is that only very important judges from
previous Courts retain any ongoing visibility in the citation patterns of
the current Court; another is that the jurisprudence of the current Court
may be similarly short-lived and similarly quick to disappear under even
more recent ideas and decisions.
The reason may be quite simple: it may be that we have picked
the only period for which these patterns cannot be generalized but must
instead (to use the judicial jargon) be confined to their own facts. By
definition, there can and will be only one Charter-entrenching event for
Canada, and only one "first generation" for Charter decisions to work
that exceptional event into the routine of judicial interpretation and
explanation. The recency of the event means that the first generation of
Charterdecisions will themselves be very recent, which necessarily and
inevitably pulls down the average and median age for follow-up judicial
citations by a Court whose intellectual efforts are largely focused on
assimilating the impact of the Charter. But later Charter decisions will
stand against the background of those first decisions-unlike the first
decisions themselves, which largely stood on their own-and this will
create a centre of gravity to citation patterns that will gradually draw the
average and median age up. Oakes49 is the most frequently cited case,
not because it is new, but because it was the first Charter decision on
section 1. Ten years from now it will still be cited whenever section 1
issues are a component of the immediate case, even though at that time
it will no longer be new. At such a time, calculations of citation
frequencies will presumably show a slower decay rate and a longer halflife than is the case for the five years that have been considered
here-that is to say, they may well look more like the figures for public
law citations in Table VII.
The transition period to the new age of Charterjurisprudence
may be largely accomplished, and most of the cases that will provide the
foundations of Supreme Court Charterdoctrine may already have been
delivered. If this is true, then the average age of follow-up citations will
trend upward over the next few years. Alternatively, the Supreme Court
may have taught itself a new style of judicial citation focusing on recent
cases to the relative exclusion of older ones. Put bluntly: will Dickson
49

Supra note 28.
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C.J. continue to loom large in the Supreme Court's citation patterns
through and past the 1990s, or will he disappear rather quickly behind
Lamer C.J. the way Laskin C.J.'s influence was eclipsed by Dickson
C.J.'s on the recent Court? Either way, the patterns described in this
paper constitute the empirical background against which these
alternative theories can be tested, and an appropriate long-term
generalization about Supreme Court citation practices developed.

